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RECENT LEGISLATION
Recent Legislation
CALL LOANS AND THE USURY LAWS
The Illinois Legislature has by a recent amendment to the
interest law, incorporated into it, almost word for word, a pro-
vision of the New York interest statute, authorizing unlimited
interest rates on loans of indefinite duration.' This provision of
the New York statute is unique but has resulted in a relatively
small amount of litigation in that state.2 This fact lends itself to
the conclusion that although it was a departure from the type of
interest statute generally provided for in other states, the New
York statutory provision was accepted without question as to
its constitutionality, and was apparently very easily interpreted
by those persons whom it affected.
At the time of the adoption of the foregoing amendment, the
Illinois interest law provided in effect that in all written loan
contracts the parties could agree upon seven per cent interest
per annum or less, provided, however, with respect to money
loaned to or due from a corporation, the parties might agree
upon any rate of interest whatsoever, and take and pay the
same.3 The provision excepting corporations from the limitation
as to the amount of interest that could be taken from them was
found in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, and 8 of the then existing interest
law,4 to which the new provision of 1929 was added. The amend-
ment reads as follows:
".. . that in any case hereafter in which advances of
money, repayable on demand, to an amount not less than
five thousand dollars, are made upon warehouse receipts,
bills of lading, certificates of stock, certificates of deposit,
bills of exchange, bonds or other negotiable instruments
pledged as collateral security for such repayment, if evi-
denced by a writing, it shall be lawful to receive or contract
to receive and collect, as compensation for making such ad-
vances, any sum to be agreed upon by the parties to such
transaction." 5
'Ill. Laws 1929, p. 535; similar New York provision, Consol. Laws N. Y.
(Cahill, 1923) c. 21 sec. 379.
' "While the statute has been in force since 1882, apparently it has not
been fruitful in litigation." Wright v. Toomey (1910) 137 App. Div.
401, 121 N. Y. S. "721.
Ill. Stat. (Cahill, 1925) c. 74 par. 4.
'An act passed in 1925 had repealed an earlier statute which specifically
denied the defense of usury to corporations. fll. Laws 1925, p. 452.
* Ill. Laws 1929, p. 535. The similar New York provision found in Laws
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The taking of the defense of usury from corporations by
statute is not a new feature in interest laws., Such statutes have
been held to be constitutional by judicial decision.7 Some states
discriminate as to the amount of interest that can be charged by
classifying loans by the amounts loaned. The Small Loans Laws
allowing a greater amount of interest to be charged on small
loans than on larger ones is a typical example of this discrimina-
tion. These laws are generally regarded as excepted from the
application of the general usury law of the state.8 Such classi-
fication and discrimination by statute in the matter of taking
interest has been held constitutional.9
The new provision of the Illinois interest law, insofar as it
places no limitation on the amount of interest that may be
charged on demand loans of $5,000 or more secured by the type
of security named in the provision, is probably a just and con-
N. Y. 1882, c. 237 sec. 1, provides: "In any case hereafter in which advances
of money, repayable on demand, to an amount not less than five thousand
dollars, are made upon warehouse receipts, bills of lading, certificates of
stock, certificates of deposit, bills of exchange, bonds or other negotiable
instruments pledged as collateral security for such repayment, it shall be
lawful to receive or contract to receive and collect as compensation for mak-
ing such advances, any sum to be agreed upon in writing, by the parties to
such transaction."
IThe defense of usury has been withheld from corporations in many
states by statute. Md. Gen. Laws (1924) art. 23 sec. 131; Consol. Laws
N. Y. (Cahill, 1923) c. 21 sec. 374; Mich. Pub. Acts (1927) no. 335, pt. 2
c. 1 sec. 1; N. J. Pub. Laws (1902) p. 459; Rev. Code Del., sec. 2621,
amended Acts 1915, c. 213.
Some cases under such statutes are: Buchholz v. Granite Say. Bank
(C. C. A. 4, 1911) 261 F. 75; Mazarin v. Hudson County Real Estate &
Bldg. Co. (1910) 80 N. J. Law 35, 76 At. 322; Scheidell v. Llewellyn
Realty Co. (1918) 177 N. Y. S. 529; Honey v. Ward-Gilbert Co. (1929) 248
Mich. 502, 277 N. W. 543; In re Bernard & Katz (C. C. A. 2, 1930) 38 F.
(2d) 40; Thomas v. Union Trust Co. (1930) 251 Mich. 279, 231 N. W. 619;
Curtis v. Leavitt (1857) 15 N. Y. 2.
' Griffith v. State (1910) 218 U. S. 563 (Connecticut statute) ; Carroza v.
Fed. Finance & Credit Co. (1925) 149 Md. 223, 131 Atl. 332 (Maryland
statute); Shriver v. Druid Realty Co. (1926) 149 Md. 385, 131 Atl. 815;
Danville v. Pace (1874) 25 Gratt. (Va.) 1.
'Ill. Laws 1925, p. 452, provides in effect that nothing in the general
statute on interest is to affect or alter the Small Loans Act of 1917 which
allows a higher rate of interest than seven per cent to be charged on loans
not amounting to $300.
'State v. Sherman (1909) 18 Wyo. 169, 105 Pac. 299; State v. Hurlburt
(1909) 82 Conn. 232, 72 Atl. 1079; Ex parte Lichtenstein (1885) 67 Cal.
359, 7 Pac. 728. In 27 R. C. L. 204 the law on the constitutionality of these
discriminations is summed up: "It is generally considered that the state
may deal with different classes of money lenders in different ways, without
offending the constitutional provisions, so long as the classification is rea-
sonable, and all those who bring themselves therein are treated uniformly."
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stitutional discrimination. This would seem to be a reasonable
implication from the fact that the provision has survived in New
York since 1882.'1 The policy of the usury laws has been stated
as a desire on the part of the state to protect borrowers, especially
poor borrowers, from the greediness of money lenders, but it,
would seem that one who owned collateral to the amount of
$5,000 which he is willing to pledge for a loan of cash does not
need the protection that the usury laws were designed to give.11
The provision in question was enacted in New York for a very
definite purpose. It was an economic necessity if transactions
on the stock market were to continue on a large scale. The
necessity for a different interest law to be applied to call loans
from that applied to ordinary loans is brought out very well by
J. E. MEEKER in his recent book, THE WORK OF THE STOCK
EXCHANGE, in which he says on page 559:
"Only the excess of loanable funds which the banks may
have from time to time are available for the collateral call
money market or for the purchase of commercial paper in
the open market. The excess of loanable funds available
for employment in the securities market varies, therefore,
according to the commercial requirements of the country.
It has long been recognized that for an assurance of a suffi-
cient amount of money to finance the volume of business in
securities, reliance cannot be placed on a rate of interest
" This provision was enacted in New York by Laws N. Y. 1882, c. 237
sec. 1. It is now found in Consol. Laws N. Y. (Cahill, 1923) c. 21 sec. 379.
When it has been called to the attention of the courts of that state it has
been upheld. Brunley v. Robinson (1923) 120 Misc. 799, 200 N. Y. S.
460; Wright v. Toomey (1910) 137 App. Div. 401, 121 N. Y. S. 721;
In re Wilde's Sons, (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1904) 133 F. 562. One decision
stretches the principle of the law so far as to prevent a forfeiture, under
the usury law, of money loaned on an oral contract, holding that even an
oral contract providing for more than the maximum rate of interest was
not usurious if it met the other requirements of the statute, but that more
than the maximum rate of interest could not be collected unless there was
a written contract so specifying. Hawley v. Kountze (1896) 6 App. Div.
217, 39 N. Y. S. 897.
" In Caldwell Co. v. Lea (1925) 152 Tenn. 48, 272 S. W. 715, the court
was called upon to determine the constitutionality of Tenn. Acts 1925, c.
69, which authorized a higher rate of interest on long term secured bonds
and notes in amounts of $50,000 or more than was authorized on other loans
in the state. The court held this law constitutional in spite of a provision
of the Tennessee Constitution that required the interest rate to be uniform
throughout the state, and gave as its reason: "Usury laws are passed to
protect the borrower, especially the poor, from the rapacity of money lend-
ers. The statute before us deals only with loans made to borrowers having
property of the value of fifty thousand dollars or more. Such persons do
not require the same protection as do others less fortunately endowed."
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
limited to the rates which obtain or are permitted in com-
mercial transactions whose prior claim on banking accom-
modations is universally conceded." 12
Thus the real necessity for such a provision exempting these
loans from the operation of the usury statute was to enable
brokers to borrow funds at times when money was scarce and
lenders would rather risk their principal at maximum legal in-
terest rates in other fields than the stock market. In times when
money is not scarce the system of call or demand loans on se-
curity collateral allows utilization of a great amount of the na-
tion's capital collected in New York banks which would other-
wise remain idle.13 When great amounts of money remain idle
the call loan interest rate is low, but when money is scarce a very
high interest rate must be paid by brokers in order to get money
with which to trade on the market, and this provision of the law
allows them to pay such interest. Thus the provision is progres-
sive and fair in recognizing that the usury law should not apply
where its application is not in accord with sound economic
principles.
Since the stock exchange in New York City is really the money
market of America it is easily understood why the State of New
York should be the first to alter its usury law in this regard.
Those who have studied the commercial and economic develop-
ment of the City of Chicago are aware of the fact that it is
rapidly becoming the money market of the Middle West. It is
not strange then that Illinois should be the second state to adopt
this exception to the usury law in recognition of the law of sup-
ply and demand of loanable funds.
The Illinois amendment of 1929, although primarily passed to
facilitate stock market transactions, is not restricted in operation
to that field alone. It applies to all demand loans of $5,000 or
more made on certain types of security collateral. The borrower
who contracts to give a very high rate of interest will not suffer
unduly under this provision, for it applies only to demand loans,
which mature within a reasonable time.14 Borrowers on call
loans on the New York Stock Exchange need not suffer the high
interest for more than a day.15 The provision of a minimum of
$5,000 to remove loans from the operation prevents the excep-
tion from applying to everyday commercial loans where the al-
'See also Rates of Interest on Collateral Call Loans, Sen. Doc. 262, 66th
Congress, 2d Session, pp. 4-6.
MEEKER, op. Cit. 177.
"Negotiable Instruments Law, Ill. Stat. (Cahill, 1929) c. 98 par. 91.
""Unlike other interest rates, these high call rates remain in force for a
single day only, the loans to which they apply being either paid off the pext
day or renewed at a lower renewal rate." MEEKER, op. cit. 194.
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lowance of any agreed rate of interest would put the small busi-
ness man in the grasp of the money lender. Persons owning
collateral of the amount that would have to be pledged in order to
borrow sums as large as $5,000 are not of the class which needs
the protection of the usury laws. 16
The fact that stock brokers are not able to obtain loans at
times when money is scarce without paying a higher rate of
interest than other borrowers are then paying for ordinary com-
mercial loans lends itself to the conclusion that lenders consider
loans to brokers on collateral security more hazardous than
ordinary commercial loans. Hazard to principal has been recog-
nized as a ground for denying the application of the usury law.'
17
The development of important call loafi markets in other cities
besides New York and Chicago will doubtless result in the exten-
sion of similar legislation to other states.
NOEL F. DELPORTE, '31.
See n. 11, supra.
" Provident Life & Trust Co. v. Fletcher (C. C. A. 2, 1919) 237 F. 104;
Curtis v. Le Mayne (1929) 248 111. App. 99.
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